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Austro-German Liberalism and the Coming of the 1867 Compromise: ‘Politics Again 
in Flux’  
 
On 7 October 1866, Adolf Pratobevera – a prominent liberal politician and former 
Justice Minister – wrote in his diary that ‘politics [is] again in flux, whether this is a 
blessing? God knows’.1 Pratobevera was writing just three months after the battle of 
Königgrätz/Hradec Králové in a period of immense instability and uncertainty for the 
Habsburg Monarchy.2 The traditional supports of the system – the Emperor, the army and 
the bureaucracy – were in a weakened state following Austria’s military defeat at Königgrätz 
and this dramatically opened the range of possibilities in politics. Indeed, the defeat threw 
the whole political system in question; a situation which sharply exposed the fault lines and 
internal political workings of the Monarchy. In the period from Königgrätz on 3 July 1866 to 
the ministerial meeting on 1 February 1867 (when the Emperor definitively decided on the 
dualist structure), all political parties and movements had the opportunity to define their 
programmes, to seek possible allies and argue their particular vision of the Monarchy’s 
political structure. 
This article focuses on those crucial seven months and on the role of the Austro-
German liberals in setting the terms of the new dualist system. Traditional interpretations 
viewed the liberals as dogmatic, divided and impotent during this period since they were 
split between competing factions, did not have a minister close to the Crown, did not 
participate in the Compromise negotiations and were never formally summoned to consult 
with the Emperor.3 Indeed, apart from the recent work of Éva Somogyi and Pieter Judson, 
the role of the Austro-German liberals in the genesis of the 1867 Compromise has been 
largely ignored. 4 This article traces two themes: first, the exertion of public pressure by the 
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liberals and, second, the convergence of the various liberal factions around a consensus 
position. To a large extent, the former provided the background accompaniment to the latter. 
By asserting their influence where possible and by eventually presenting a united front, the 
liberals played a key role in the 1867 political settlement. Their repeated demands for a 
liberal constitutional system meant that when Emperor Francis Joseph required their support 
to realise the 1867 Compromise with Hungary, the liberals could insist on drafting and 
installing a progressive, liberal constitution along with an extensive institutional and legal 
framework.  
Throughout the seven months of political flux, the liberals had to balance a powerful 
assertion of liberal demands against the danger of alienating the Emperor and his 
government. It was a difficult balance. Austro-German liberal influence at this time was 
based on public discourse, informal contacts, organizational networks and institutional 
leverage. By utilising these channels the Austro-German liberals constituted an important 
factor in the mental framework and the practical limits for any new settlement. For example, 
even as Prussian troops were approaching Vienna, municipal representative bodies with 
liberal majorities bravely – perhaps foolishly – sent messages directly to the Emperor 
questioning his government’s conduct. In addition, the liberal press – both in newspapers 
and contemporary brochures – vigorously debated government decisions, constitutional 
matters, political tactics, the nature of parliament and the place of German-speakers in the 
Monarchy. Not only did this public discussion promote a clear articulation of liberal 
demands, it also continued the process of developing the public sphere and opening 
governmental decision making.  
Coupled with this overt, wide-ranging pressure on the Emperor and his ministers, the 
vast majority of liberals – when under threat and facing an uncertain future – showed a 
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combination of ideological flexibility and hard-headed pragmatism to unite around realisable 
shared core beliefs. This process was neither straight-forward nor smooth. In terms of 
traditions, organization, political structure and ideology, the Austro-German liberal 
movement tended towards division and difference. Between such disparate regions as Tyrol, 
Bohemia, Styria, Vienna and so on, conditions, issues and personalities varied enormously. 
This article plots the machinations of the liberal factions in detail in an attempt to portray 
both the wide spectrum of liberal opinion and the gradual, difficult process of achieving 
unity in action and principles. By January 1867 all of the major factions within the liberal 
movement were prepared to accept and implement the Compromise with Hungary provided 
that the Emperor and his government respected two fundamental conditions: the 
reinstallation of constitutional life and the building of a centralist, liberal Cisleithanian state.5 
Both conditions contained the unspoken, implicit assumption of political and cultural 
hegemony for German-speakers in the Cisleithanian political and administrative structure.6 
The exertions of the liberals finally came to fruition in December 1867 with the 
promulgation of constitutional laws and the installation of the so called Burger Ministry 
(Bürgerministerium) consisting of liberal parliamentarians. This represented the high water 
mark of Austro-German liberalism. These achievements in 1867 all rested on a sustained 
campaign of liberal public pressure and on the coalescence of Austro-German liberal 
factions. 
  
     *** 
 
At the outbreak of the Austro-Prussian war, the liberals had been preoccupied with fighting 
the new government of Count Richard Belcredi, which had been in place since 27 July 1865. 
 4 
In particular, Belcredi’s 1865 September Manifesto which suspended the 1861 February 
Patent (and thus also the Imperial Parliament) had provoked sustained and vocal protest from 
the liberals. Belcredi had wanted to facilitate negotiations with Hungarian representatives – 
who had boycotted the Imperial Parliament – and to induce their participation in state and 
political institutions. The Austro-German liberals, on the other hand, defended the February 
Patent which, with some reservations, they treated as a starting point for the development of 
a truly liberal and progressive Austria.7 Throughout the early to mid 1860s – sometimes in 
harmony but later increasingly in conflict with Anton Schmerling’s bureaucratic, liberal-
leaning government – the parliamentary liberals had worked on legislation (with varying 
degrees of success) for communal autonomy, ministerial responsibility, immunity for 
representatives, financial and economic laws, an independent judiciary, freedom of the press 
and a secular State. These issues were fundamental to nearly all liberals and relatively 
uncontentious within their ranks. The liberals were loyal to the February Patent (they called 
it the February Constitution) as the starting point for liberal reforms and had formed a loose 
political grouping under the umbrella term, the Constitutional Party (Verfassungspartei).  
Despite the existence of the Constitutional Party, there was little party discipline in 
the early to mid 1860s. It was a time of fluid ideologies and provisional judgements as the 
liberals sought to articulate their vision of Austria. In terms of state structure, most liberal 
viewpoints were perched somewhere between strict governmental centralism and extensive 
local autonomy, often including arguments from both ends of the spectrum.8 Of the many 
liberal factions, the strict centralists were mainly from Vienna and Moravia and remained 
ideologically opposed to any special privileges for Hungary. Their principal goal was to 
install centralist institutions based in Vienna, to set up a legal framework consistent 
throughout the whole Monarchy and to infuse government with a liberal spirit. Close to the 
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centralists were the Bohemian Germans. Conscious of their potential minority status in the 
Bohemian Diet (this depended on the composition of the Bohemian Great Landowners’ 
curia) they formed a unified bloc. Most Bohemian German politicians looked to a strong 
central Viennese government and parliament as the best policy for ensuring liberal progress 
and protecting Bohemian German interests.9 Their parliamentary leader was the upright, 
strict, legal professor Eduard Herbst, sarcastically known as ‘King Eduard of German-
Bohemia’.10  His political convictions remained essentially the same throughout his long 
public life: a central state (which automatically protected the German position in Bohemia 
and Austria), a strong parliament and a constitutional, modern Austria. He fought against 
any hints of federalism and absolutism. While often criticised by his colleagues as negative 
and ‘the misfortune of the party’, beneath Herbst’s formidable political exterior lay a 
conception of a centralised Austria with a watchful, independent, powerful parliament.11  
At the other end of the liberal spectrum, the more radical liberals emphasised the 
protection of individual rights, ministerial responsibility and parliamentary control over state 
expenditure – all directly or indirectly restricting the power and authority of the state. Many 
of these liberals were in the Autonomist camp, based in Styria and Upper Austria. The 
Autonomists placed their faith in communal autonomy as the centre of political life; it 
should, they argued, form the fundament of the state structure.12 One of their leaders Moriz 
von Kaiserfeld criticised liberalism’s centralist tendencies in a letter dated 4 March 1866: 
I am very worried about the centralist ideas which are so deep in their [the 
centralists’] souls. Instead of restricting their ideas to the lands on this side of the 
Leitha (i.e. the German provinces), the centralists extend them to the whole 
Monarchy, where they don’t have sufficient strength for such leadership. Whoever 
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doesn’t have political rule will be oppressed. Whoever cannot be the hammer in this 
tangle of nationalities must become the anvil.13 
After the installation of the Belcredi government, the Autonomists had sought contact with 
their Hungarian liberal counterparts and were open to some form of mutual understanding. 
In February 1866 Kaiserfeld wrote to the Hungarian liberal leader Ferenc Deák that they 
should meet in Budapest to discuss the basis of constitutional life. Other liberals close to the 
Autonomist camp were prepared to put their heads above the parapet and risk censure from 
the strict centralists by advocating a dualist solution. Amidst feverish activity in the 
Hungarian parliament before the outbreak of war, Adolph Fischhof, a hero of the 1848 
Revolutions, published an article in the Pester Lloyd (Budapest’s main German newspaper) 
in January 1866 identifying himself as joint author of the 1861 dualist brochure Zur Lösung 
der ungarischen Frage. He showed evident sympathy with Hungary’s cause; ‘born in 
Hungary, I have always remained affectionate towards it with love, warmth and loyalty’.14  
On the Hungarian side, the moderate liberals grouped around Ferenc Deák presented 
a united front and were well placed leading up to the outbreak of war. Their leverage 
stemmed from an insistence on the 1848 April Laws, a refusal to accept the February 
Constitution, their boycott of its institutions and the subsequent breakdown of the 
governmental system. The overwhelming majority of the Austro-German liberals, especially 
the centralists, had rejected Deák’s assertion of special Hungarian rights and had supported 
Schmerling’s attempt to form a central parliament. However, with the installation of 
Belcredi and the suspension of the constitution, the government seemed to favour some 
compromise with the Hungarians. Informal contact between Deák and an emissary of 
Francis Joseph’s had been made in secret as early as December 1864. Within months Deák’s 
celebrated Easter Article appeared and on 15 December 1865 the recalled Hungarian 
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parliament voted for a committee to draft the conditions of a possible Compromise. Despite 
some disagreements between Deák’s moderates and Kálmán Tisza’s radicals, the draft was 
swiftly finished and was ready for discussion as the war with Prussia broke out. 15 Thus, 
leading up to Königgrätz, the Hungarian liberals were in powerful position. They were in 
dialogue with the Belcredi government, knew that the Emperor wanted a compromise and 
now possessed a detailed plan of their demands. The Austro-German liberals, however, were 
divided over possible concessions with the Hungarian politicians. Some were prepared to 
cede considerable autonomy while others continued to insist on centralist institutions.  
In Bohemia and Moravia, the divided liberals faced the alliance of Czech nationalist 
politicians and conservative nobles. Politically, the Czech-conservative alliance, which was 
formed for tactical purposes in 1861, viewed Belcredi’s suspension of the February Patent as 
a moment to refound the Austrian state along federalist principles. In particular, the Czech-
conservative alliance rested on the assertion of Bohemian state rights (including Moravian 
and Silesian rights).16 In the run-up to the Austro-Prussian war, after a period of German 
nationalist dominance since 1861, both the Bohemian and Moravian Diets were tending 
towards Czech-conservative majorities courtesy of governmental pressure on the ‘nebulous’ 
swing representatives in the respective Great Landowners’ curias.17 Throughout 1865, 
Belcredi’s government had also been negotiating with the Czech nationalist and conservative 
noble leaders who reiterated their demand for Bohemian state rights.18 Belcredi – from a 
Moravian family, of strong Catholic beliefs and a fluent speaker of Czech – knew Bohemia 
well, while his brother Egbert Belcredi was the leader of the Moravian noble conservatives. 
Thus the Czech-conservative noble alliance seemed to be paying off. Francis Joseph had 
promised to be crowned Bohemian King and the Belcredi government was seriously 
considering the possibility of Bohemian state rights.19 
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 The domestic situation in early 1866 was therefore still undecided and the Belcredi 
government had kept its options open. While all three possibilities – centralism, dualism or 
federalism – were on the table, circumstances and government opinion were tending to the 
latter two, to the detriment of Austro-German liberal centralist hopes. The Austro-German 
liberals found themselves without a central parliament, fighting a conservative government, 
excluded from consultation over the future organisation of the Monarchy, and facing 
minority status in the Bohemian and Moravian Diets. This meant a redoubling of efforts on 
the levers which remained in Austro-German liberal hands – their dominance of the press, 
their voice in representative institutions with liberal majorities (both municipalities and 
Diets) and the influence of highly placed bureaucrats with liberal centralist leanings. 
Through their use of the public sphere, the liberals could exert considerable pressure in the 
fluid, post-Königgrätz situation, despite their continued exclusion from official government 
negotiations.   
 
    *** 
 
In its first considered response to Königgrätz, the main liberal newspaper the Neue Freie 
Presse (NFP) set the tone for the Austro-German liberal reaction. The newspaper attributed 
the defeat primarily to Belcredi’s conservative government and to the uncertain, 
unconstitutional domestic conditions for which it held him responsible. The NFP, typically, 
was not shy about giving advice – even at this delicate moment when the army had suffered 
a devastating defeat and Vienna faced occupation. 
Lofty silence towards Hungary, becoming even loftier, was no way to bring about the 
revival which was needed for the immense undertaking of a dual war in North and 
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South ... the entire domestic situation of the Empire was inappropriate to face this 
massive test and part of the responsibility for the present situation rests on those 
whose advice had helped bring it about...[Therefore] the domestic system must be 
totally changed, Hungary must be satisfied and the Empire on this side of the Leitha 
must be guaranteed a solid constitutional future through the calling of truly liberal 
men to advise the crown and through the reactivation of the constitution. Here lies 
the salvation, the possibility of rehabilitating Austria domestically and within 
Germany – any other way leads to new weakness and certain ruin.20 
The pressure from liberal newspapers was backed up by public calls from representative 
bodies. Just three days after Königgrätz on 7 July 1866, the Salzburg Town Council sent a 
unanimous address to the Emperor calling for the restoration of the February constitution 
and the convening of the Imperial Parliament.21 The Graz town council followed a few days 
later, sending an address drafted by the prominent Autonomist liberal Karl Rechbauer. 
Echoing the opinions of the NFP, it called for a ‘decisive break’ with the past and a ‘true, 
liberal, popular constitutional life’. The address pleaded for the Emperor to have faith in a 
‘free people’, thus ensuring Austria’s future.22  
 The war was not yet over. In the capital, as the population and government prepared 
for a Prussian advance and possible occupation, the liberal-majority Town Council was 
concerned about a possible battle in Vienna itself. In an audience with the Emperor, 
representatives of the Town Council were assured that Vienna would be an ‘open city’.23 On 
17 July 1866, as the war came ever closer, the Vienna Town Council discussed an address to 
the Emperor to profess its loyalty and to express its wishes for the future. Amidst cheers 
from the galleries, Councillor Khunn read the address which had been drafted by a 
committee of prominent liberal politicians including Cajetan Felder, Joseph Kopp, Ignaz 
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Kuranda, Johann N. Berger and Eduard Suess. The address blamed the calamitous situation 
on the unfortunate policies of the Emperor’s advisors (implying his ministers). It also called 
for the participation of representative bodies in policy making and a ‘truly liberal policy’.24 
A delegation led by Mayor Andreas Zelinka delivered the address personally on 23 July 
1866. The emperor immediately queried the council’s jurisdiction, acknowledging the 
address’s contents not as a representative of Vienna’s will but merely as an expression of the 
council’s individual members. The Emperor expressed his warmest wishes for return to 
constitutional life, but cautioned that the interests of the entire state (Gesamtstaat) had to be 
taken into account.25 When Mayor Zelinka delivered his account of the meeting to a council 
meeting the next day, there was public disquiet at the Emperor’s responses, which were 
interpreted as questioning the residents’ patriotism and willingness to sacrifice. A new 
delegation was sent to confirm the council’s (and the population’s) loyalty and to convey the 
public’s distress at the Emperor’s attitude.26 The NFP was typically forthright, stating that 
the whole Town Council was prepared to resign for its liberal principles were it not for the 
critical situation. For the NFP the council’s address reflected public sentiment for the 
constitution and against absolutism.27 By contrast, another liberal newspaper, the Presse, 
supported the Emperor’s position arguing that it was for him to decide upon any change to 
the system.28 It is instructive that the initial reflex reaction from many Austro-German 
liberals to the defeat was a reassertion of their deep-rooted belief in constitutionalism and a 
continuation of their fight against Belcredi, rather than a simple profession of loyalty to the 
Emperor and the Monarchy. 
 In light of the ongoing war and their lack of real influence in government and 
Imperial circles, the liberals were in no position to push the Emperor into making a decision 
in their favour. It was an inappropriate and inflammatory time for liberals to air their 
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grievances at being excluded from government and at the suspension of the February 
Constitution. The Austro-German liberals were blinded by their hopes for a constitutional, 
progressive, liberal Austria and their indignation at the recent suspension of the constitution. 
Even the NFP acknowledged the ambiguous nature of the addresses arguing that, in fact it 
was very patriotic to send them, despite the desperate situation for the Monarchy.29 
Tactically the pressure was provocative and certainly did not endear the liberals to the 
Emperor, yet, at the same time, it demonstrated the strength of their convictions and 
reasserted their influence in public. In stark contrast to the liberals’ ill-timed comments, the 
Archbishop of Vienna Cardinal Joseph Rauscher preached absolute loyalty to the dynasty, 
duty to the state, adherence to Christian beliefs and called for Austrian patriotism.30 In 
Austria’s time of need, the Emperor could not have been presented with a better reminder of 
the Church’s symbiotic relationship with the dynasty and the Monarchy.  
Francis Joseph canvassed opinion as soon as news of Königgrätz reached Vienna. On 
14 July 1866 there were reports that the leader of the Bohemian constitutionalist  
(Verfassungstreu) nobles, Carl Auersperg, had attended long audiences with the Emperor 
and had presented a finished liberal programme that consisted of recalling the ‘narrow’ 
Imperial Parliament under the February Patent (i.e. without Hungary), recognizing the 
Hungarian parliament and allowing both bodies to negotiate common matters.31 Auersperg 
could, however, only speak for his constitutionally-loyal faction in the Bohemian Great 
Landowners’ curia since there was no unified, accepted liberal programme; indeed, there 
was no single, acknowledged leader of the Constitutional Party. Shortly afterwards, on 17 
July 1866 Deák met with Francis Joseph in Vienna. The Hungarian politicians under Deák’s 
leadership presented a contrast to the impatient Austro-German liberals. Despite pressure 
from some radical fractions and the threat of a Lajos Kossuth inspired anti-Habsburg 
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uprising, Deák was in firm control of Hungarian politics and pursued measured, steady, 
focussed tactics. When asked what his demands were given the new situation, he uttered the 
famous phrase ‘nothing more than before’.32 Deák immediately delegated the negotiations to 
Gyula Andrássy who proved to be a tremendously skilled politician and an untiring advocate 
of dualism. In his meetings with Francis Joseph, Andrássy – obviously thinking of 
Hungary’s nationality issues – argued that there should be no autonomy for the Slavs.33 He 
advised Francis Joseph that ‘dualism must be newly built upon the two pillars of the 
Monarchy, the Germans and Hungarians. They are the elements which above all must be 
satisfied.’34 For the Austro-German liberals a ‘natural’ alliance could be formed with the 
Hungarians as long as the centralists could accept the dualist structure. There was even some 
talk of a united conference involving Deák, Andrássy, Jozsef Eötvös, Herbst, Kaiserfeld and 
Karl Giskra to determine a common stance against federalism and the pro-Slav policies of 
Belcredi.35 Such a conference, however, never took place.  
Through the peace negotiations and their aftermath, official government meetings 
with the Hungarians were continuing. Alexander von Hübner, a conservative diplomat who 
had been schooled under Metternich and had served as Police Minister for a short time in 
1859, was recalled from his position as ambassador to the Vatican and became heavily 
involved in the talks in July and August 1866. 36 Initially, he was reluctant to aid a former 
revolutionary émigré like Andrássy but he overcame his qualms in the course of 
negotiations.37 The negotiations dragged on. At the end of August Hübner advised the 
Emperor that it would be premature to involve any representative bodies in such a 
complicated matter as these negotiations with Hungary – an approach that harmonized well 
with Francis Joseph’s instincts.38 When Hübner declined the chance to form a new ministry, 
Francis Joseph sent him back to the Vatican in September. After his final audience with the 
 13 
Emperor, Hübner wrote in his diary that Francis Joseph was now master of the situation.39 
Following the confusion and disorder of the immediate post-Königgrätz situation, the 
traditional forms of governance were slowly reasserting themselves. The ministry, the 
coterie around the Emperor and the Emperor himself were again taking charge of the 
Monarchy. But their options were limited by a number of considerations; first, the 
Monarchy’s weakened position, second, the balance of domestic forces (which necessitated a 
resolution with Hungary) and, third, the desire to quickly reassert the Monarchy’s ‘Great 
Power’ status.   
While Hungarian politicians negotiated with the government, the Czech-conservative 
noble alliance worked behind the scenes. The Bohemian conservative nobles were not 
prepared to use their contacts at the Imperial Court partly because of the sensitive 
circumstances but also because they were awaiting a direct invitation from the Emperor.40 In 
governmental circles they relied on Belcredi. In the new situation, František Rieger (leader 
of the Bohemian Czech nationalists), Alois Pražák (leader of the Moravian Czechs) and 
Jindřich Clam-Martinic (leader of the Bohemian conservative nobles) met frequently to 
determine a combined Czech-conservative line. In late July 1866, with war still raging in 
Bohemia and Moravia, Rieger prepared a set of demands: a commitment to Austria, equality 
of languages in Bohemia (Czech and German) and a federalist constitution.41 Around this 
time, both Rieger and his father-in-law František Palacký, the notable historian and political 
leader, were summoned to Vienna for political negotiations. They set off on 23 July 1866, a 
day after their programme of demands was completed. Rieger spoke informally to the 
Emperor on 30 July, though with little discernable effect. A more detailed programme was 
subsequently presented to the Emperor.42 It first stated that there should be no more foreign 
entanglements in Germany and that Austria should concentrate on its domestic organisation 
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and constitutional development. In fact, this did happen as a condition of the peace 
settlement with Prussia, finally putting to rest Czech fears of permanent minority status in a 
‘Greater Germany’ (Großdeutschland) including the western provinces of the Monarchy. In 
the new circumstances, Rieger asserted that any future constitution should be formed on the 
basis of the federalist October Diploma and any central parliament and government in 
Vienna should have a minimum of powers vis-a-vis regional Diets. Each Diet would also 
have a representative on the government as Court Chancellor. In general, according to the 
Czech-conservative programme, autonomy and self government should constitute the 
general principles underlying the governmental system. With respect to the language issue, 
particularly incendiary in Bohemian, the principle would be one of equality. 
While in Vienna Rieger searched for possible allies to the federalist cause and was 
initially quite successful. He met with a Polish delegation and individual Slovene leaders 
throughout July and August 1866. Interestingly Rieger was also thinking of possible co-
operation with the Autonomists and sent them an invitation on 25 August 1866.43 Rieger 
stressed that this was an epoch making moment and that a clear viewpoint was needed. He 
met with the Autonomist leaders in Vienna and hoped that there could be a common liberal 
German-Czech front (and possibly an even wider alliance including the South Slavs and 
Poles). Rieger was hoping to split the liberal camp and to form a broad coalition for a 
federalist structure. Nevertheless, the Czech leaders’ room to compromise with Austro-
German liberal factions was restricted by their continued loyalty to the Bohemian 
conservative nobles’ alliance.   
With Bohemia and Moravia under occupation and centralists in disarray, Kaiserfeld 
and the Styrian Autonomists had become the clear leaders of the Austro-German liberals. 
Ideologically and practically, the Autonomists were the only Austro-German liberals who 
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could compromise with all the nationalist parties, especially the Czechs nationalists, who 
posed no threat in Styria or Upper Austria but could still form a majority with the 
conservative nobles in the Bohemian and Moravian Diets.44 At this crucial juncture, 
however, Moriz von Kaiserfeld’s nervous, high-strung character played a significant role. 
Belcredi described Kaiserfeld as ‘moving from place to place with contradictory feelings’ 
and there is much evidence for this.45 Kaiserfeld was now in a pivotal position; his support 
of a liberal, federalist programme would make it a realistic possibility and could point the 
way towards new multi-national co-operation. While the Autonomists and the Czech 
nationalist leaders held tentative meetings in mid-August, Kaiserfeld remained extremely 
concerned about upsetting the centralist liberal groups, especially the German liberal leaders 
in Bohemia and Moravia.46 At the very moment when the Czech nationalists and 
Autonomists were investigating the possibility of co-operation, their various political 
alliances and wider concerns drew them back.  
Kaiserfeld was very cautious about negotiating with the Czech nationalists due to 
their association with Belcredi and to German nationalist sentiment in Bohemia and 
Moravia. Immediately after Königgrätz, the Autonomists’ press organ, the Graz-based 
Telegraf, had called for justice for all peoples, especially in Hungary.47  
The NFP was non-committal but expressed concern about the future position of the Austro-
Germans in any possible plan for a liberal, federal Austria.48 Now, when many were looking 
to him for guidance, Kaiserfeld hesitated. Hungary, of course, was an easier issue for 
Kaiserfeld. He had good connections with Hungarian liberals and even met with the leader 
Menyhért Lónyay on 14 August 1866. They spoke of a united German-Hungarian liberal 
conference against Belcredi’s pro-Slav federalism but this never eventuated.49 Since there 
was only a scattered, politically insignificant German-speaking population in Hungary with 
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few links to the Cisleithanian liberals, conceding power to a Hungarian parliament was less 
problematic from a German national viewpoint than regional autonomy to Bohemia and 
Moravia where powerful and significant German-speaking populations faced possible 
Czech-conservative majorities in the Diets. Moreover, a strong centralist element within the 
Constitutional Party continued to oppose any major concessions to the Hungarian dualists 
and refused to countenance any talk of substantial regional autonomy that might benefit the 
Czech-conservative federalist alliance. 
Kaiserfeld called a conference of Austro-German liberals for 9 and 10 September 
1866, at the small Styrian town of Bad Aussee. Kaiserfeld wanted to gauge the possibility of 
liberal unity through a programme of concessions to Hungary and a liberal state based on 
local and regional autonomy. Personal invitations were sent to prominent liberals and among 
the delegates who attended were regional liberal leaders Karl Wiser from Upper Austria; 
Karl Giskra and Eduard Sturm from Moravia; Johann Nepomuk Berger and Julius Alexander 
Schindler from Vienna and Karl Rechbauer from Styria. Significantly, no representative 
from Bohemia attended. Initially, there was no final programme, only a set of principles: 
namely, support for a dualist solution (but no federalism), a return to constitutional life (the 
February Constitution with its Imperial Parliament), the need to recognise the historical 
position of Germans in Austria, the continued possibility of a link with Germany and the 
need for a united German party.50  
Responses to the Aussee conference varied enormously. The old Presse maintained 
an attitude of strict centralism and condemned the conference as a concession to the 
nationalities.51 The Fremden-Blatt in a series of detailed articles welcomed the initiative but 
stressed that the programme needed the support of all liberals and the involvement of 
ordinary people.52 The Czech nationalist leader Rieger came out against the Aussee 
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conference, clearly disappointed with Kaiserfeld’s strong pro-Hungarian line and his 
statements against federalism.53 The most influential liberal paper, the NFP, generally 
favoured to the statement of principles but found the manifesto confusing. The Autonomists 
were traditionally protective of regional Diet rights but if dualism was to be pursued, who 
exactly would negotiate with the Hungarians: the individual Diets or the Imperial 
Parliament? The NFP was firmly in favour of the latter.54 In general the NFP agreed that 
dualism was the only real alternative in the present circumstances and that the Constitutional 
Party should negotiate the terms of the Compromise on behalf of Cisleithania, especially the 
joint matters.55 There were increasing concerns that without an Imperial Parliament 
providing a forum and moral weight for Austro-German liberal voices, the reorganisation of 
the Monarchy would be conducted without their participation and possibly to their detriment. 
‘Should we Austro-Germans remain in the corner without any consideration, our wishes just 
dying away unheard?’ asked the NFP.56  
Some liberal, federalist voices still pleaded for a multi-national, progressive alliance. 
In the Telegraf Adolph Fischhof published a series of articles, which appeared shortly after 
the Aussee Conference. They were subsequently collected in a brochure Ein Blick auf 
Österreichs Lage (A Look at the Condition of Austria) and provoked much comment.57 
Fischhof had been a member of the 1849 constitutional committee at the Kremsier/Kroměříž 
parliament, involving German-speaking and Czech-speaking representatives, which had 
agreed on a draft constitution. Although no longer an active politician, Fischhof remained in 
contact with other liberals, published the occasional article and kept abreast of all political 
developments. Though he was not officially part of the Autonomist group he moved in their 
circles and published in their newspaper.  
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Similarly to Rieger and Palacký, Fischhof saw in the new situation, where the various 
inter-relationships were much clearer, an opportunity for reconciliation and understanding 
between the peoples of the monarchy.58 For both Fischhof and the Czech nationalists, 
Austria’s exclusion from Germany meant the end to any assumptions from 1848-49 about a 
‘Greater Germany’ which would include the western provinces of the Monarchy but leave a 
merely personal union with Hungary.59 Indeed, Fischhof noted that the Hungarians were 
even talking of a real union; namely, substantial links between the two halves of the 
monarchy. He believed that the reform of the Austrian state could now take priority without 
the distraction of German affairs and without overt German nationalism. Fischhof worried 
that staying within the bounds of existing institutions would continue the dangerous 
‘parliamentary battles of the races’ with boycotts, rigged elections, heated rhetoric and 
factional intrigues leading to the nationalities fighting each other.60 He argued for a private 
conference of party leaders and representatives of the government to agree on the 
fundamentals of the new constitution – in effect, an informal constitutional convention.61 
Fischhof evoked the example of Kremsier in 1849 to show that understanding between the 
nationalities was possible.62 Indeed, his suggestion of a private conference of party leaders 
essentially tried to reproduce the conditions of the Kremsier parliament. Fischhof 
specifically urged the Autonomist party to take the initiative and to host the conference since 
they were a ‘middle party’ – as Germans they had links to the centralists, they could agree 
with the Czech nationalists on ideological grounds, and their recent stance had gained 
respect in Hungary.63 Rieger was encouraged by Fischhof’s suggestion of a pre-
parliamentary conference, as was the Polish leader Agenor Gołuchowski, though both 
wanted the Autonomists to issue the invitation.64 Anton Auersperg (the famous poet-
politician from Carniola) agreed to the meeting but wondered how practical the idea was, 
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while Jozsef Eötvös, maintaining Hungarian solidarity with Deák and Andrássy, opposed the 
idea.65 The NFP also opposed Fischhof’s proposals arguing that private conferences would 
undermine the authority of a subsequent parliament. The real issue for the newspaper 
remained the formation of a great Austro-German liberal party that would join the 
Autonomists with the Centralists.66  
The initiative remained with Kaiserfeld. The Autonomists would have to initiate any 
possible private conference or new multi-national alliance or formation of an integrated 
liberal party. Yet the Aussee Conference had not created momentum within Austro-German 
liberal ranks, neither in favour of autonomy and self-administration, nor for contact with 
other parties about a possible joint liberal programme based on civic and political freedom. 
Under pressure from the Presse and other centralist critics, Kaiserfeld then performed an 
astonishing volte-face on 20 September 1866 and disavowed the Aussee Programme. 
Kaiserfeld now moved towards a more centralist position to the consternation of many in the 
Autonomist camp who had been contemplating talks with the Czech nationalists.67 
By the beginning of October, the Autonomists had clearly lost their opportunity of 
brokering a transnational, multi-party agreement. The centralists were mobilizing as were the 
Bohemian Germans and no meaningful basis for co-operation with the Czech-conservative, 
Polish or Slovene-clerical camps had emerged. On 4 October 1866 the centralists gathered at 
the Viennese residence of the Moravian industrialist Alfred von Skene. Among the fifteen 
delegates were the former ministers Josef Lasser, Adolf Pratobevera, Franz Hein; former 
Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Imperial Parliament Leopold Hasner, Hein (again), 
Franz von Hopfen; and the leading liberals Eugen Mühlfeld, Karl Giskra and Julius 
Alexander Schindler – a weighty gathering. Giskra and Schindler had also attended the Bad 
Aussee conference. Kaiserfeld was invited but declined to come, citing his wife’s illness. His 
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close collaborator Karl Rechbauer was not invited.68 Significantly, the leader of the 
Bohemian-German liberals Eduard Herbst remained in Prague.69 A committee including 
Hasner and Pratobevera was delegated to prepare a programme. The influential centralists 
refused to concede to the Autonomists’ viewpoint.70  
On 7 October 1866 Eduard Herbst hosted a meeting of Bohemian Germans in Prague 
and called for a general conference with representatives from all fractions of the German 
liberal spectrum.71 Somogyi has suggested that Herbst was not in complete agreement with 
the centralist meeting in Vienna and, considering the Bohemian German position as a 
minority in the Bohemian Diet, was more receptive to Kaiserfeld’s dualist position.72 In all 
probability he and the Bohemian Germans were holding back, staying united and waiting to 
follow the best course in order to protect their position in Bohemia. The NFP report of the 
meeting in Prague’s German Casino suggests that Herbst had reservations about both the 
Vienna meeting and about Kaiserfeld’s conciliatory stance towards the Hungarians, stating 
the old assumption that dualist concessions were based on Austria being involved in a 
‘Greater Germany’.73 In the new situation, the Bohemian German liberals now assumed the 
key position from the Autonomists within the Austro-German liberal camp. By maintaining 
discipline among the approximately 40 Bohemian German liberals who had sat in the 
Imperial parliament, Herbst held the balance of power between the centralist and the 
Autonomist wings.  
Herbst’s primary concerns were the protection of Bohemian German interests, the 
prevention of Belcredi’s federalism and the installation of realistic, centralist 
constitutionalism based on the February Patent. On 18 October 1866, the five man centralist 
committee under Hasner and Pratobevera presented its draft programme: the restoration of 
the February Patent, the calling of the full ‘wider’ Imperial Parliament (i.e. including 
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Hungary) and the maintenance of state unity.74 In response, the Telegraf noted that German 
nationalist solidarity and recognition of the February Constitution were common causes, but 
the time for an ideal ‘integrated, constitutional Austria’ was past and something more was 
required.75 A draft programme from the Aussee conference was in wide circulation at the 
time, though the final document was only published on 17 November 1866.76 It emphasised 
one goal which could bring the peoples of Austria together: personal, civic and political 
freedom.77 The basis of this free Austria, according to the Aussee programme, would be the 
autonomous administrative commune along with extensive powers for the Diets which 
would allow national development. Hungarian rights were recognised but common matters 
should be controlled by a directly elected common parliament. Any negotiations with 
Hungarian delegates should, according to the programme, be through the February Patent’s 
Imperial Parliament. Events, however, had progressed since the Aussee conference and there 
was little likelihood that all factions of the Constitutional Party would agree to its 
programme. Around this time, Fischhof continued advocating private conferences of the 
party leaders and a search for common interests but he was an increasingly isolated voice.78 
In effect, the range of possibilities was being reduced by the reassertion of traditional liberal 
factions, though the overall situation favoured the dualist viewpoint of Kaiserfeld’s 
Autonomists. 
Herbst and his Bohemian Germans now faced two options: the centralists’ demands 
for an integrated state with minimal concessions to the Hungarians, or Kaiserfeld’s amended 
position which accepted a dualist construction with the implicit securing of German 
hegemony over the Western half of the monarchy. There was little possibility of reconciling 
the two views as evidenced in an article by the leading centralist Alfred von Skene in the 
Presse on 27 October 1866. Skene and the centralists portrayed themselves as the protectors 
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of the Austrian state and of German speakers in mixed areas, drawing a sharp distinction 
between their centralist views and the provincial-oriented German nationalism of the 
Autonomists.79 This clear disunity in the ranks of the Austro-German liberals, lamented the 
NFP, contrasted unfavourably with the discipline of the Czechs, Poles and Hungarians.80 
Faced with Austria’s exclusion from Germany, Czech-conservative supremacy in the 
Bohemian Diet and continued Hungarian intransigence to any form of centralism, Herbst 
began moving towards Kaiserfeld’s camp and acceptance of a possible compromise with the 
Hungarians.81  
 The appointment of Ferdinand Beust as Foreign Minister on 30 October 1866 
brought a fundamental change to the situation. Beust’s appointment was not greeted with 
approbation in Austria; most liberals did not want a foreigner in the most prestigious 
ministerial position.82 Yet he was a potential ally, one who was both close to the throne and 
had a reputation as a political progressive. Though officially only Foreign Minister, Beust 
interpreted his remit as including internal matters, especially since the monarchy’s 
international position depended on settling its domestic uncertainties. Beust quickly 
concluded that the Hungarian question had to be resolved and was soon won over by 
Andrássy’s arguments for dualism based on German hegemony in the West and Hungarian 
hegemony in the East.83 The scene was set a united Austro-German liberal position based on 
a Herbst-Kaiserfeld axis and an acceptance of a dualist compromise with Hungary. 
  
     *** 
 
The upcoming Diet sessions and the associated address debates in November and December 
1866 brought further clarification to viewpoints and more factional repositioning. Across the 
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Empire nineteen Diets would be meeting – seventeen in Cisleithania plus the Hungarian and 
Croatian parliaments – and this was the first opportunity for representative bodies to 
contribute to the debate on the Monarchy’s future. It was common practice for representative 
bodies to draft an address of thanks to the Emperor at the start of a session and in the 1860s 
these address debates were taken very seriously. They provided a forum for wide-ranging 
debates about general principles and goals, while presenting an opportunity to communicate 
the Diet’s wishes to the Emperor. At the beginning of the sessions in late 1866, nearly all 
Diets would take the opportunity to put forward their point of view in addresses to the 
Emperor. Indeed of the seventeen in Cisleithania, eleven sent addresses, including majority 
and minority addresses from Bohemia and Galicia, while six (Carniola, Tyrol, Dalmatia, 
Goerz, Trieste and Vorarlberg) declined the opportunity. The address debates accelerated 
two developments. First, they sharpened the divisions between opposing political groups, 
especially between the German and Czech nationalist politicians in Moravia and Bohemia. 
Second, they emphasised the need for unity in Austro-German liberal ranks and focussed 
attention on the shared beliefs underpinning the different liberal factions.  
 The Lower Austrian Diet was the first to debate an address on 26 November 
1866, it set the tone for the general Austro-German liberal position.84 The address 
emphasized what united the liberals – outrage at the suspension of the constitution, a desire 
to revive the February Patent and vigorous assertions about the ‘German’ contribution to 
Austria – with few specific remedies and no mention of the differences between centralists 
and Autonomists. The address began with the obligatory expressions of loyalty and 
patriotism towards the Emperor but quickly painted an alarming picture of the Empire after 
the suspension of the constitution in September 1865. Provocative phrases such as ‘growing 
fissures and weakness in Austria’ and ‘corroding pessimism’ were used to emphasise the 
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consequences of Belcredi’s non-constitutional government.85 In such a situation the Lower 
Austrian Diet (and the population it represented) looked to the Emperor to draw together the 
Monarchy’s strength through the ‘speedy reinstatement of constitutional conditions’. The 
draft address implicitly accepted dualism by advocating an understanding with Hungary and 
by admiring the restoration of the Hungarian constitution (presumably the calling of the 
Hungarian parliament). Andreas Zelinka, who was also the Mayor of Vienna, defended the 
position of Germans in Austria, stating that ‘[f]or centuries the only binding element has 
been German culture and language, which has combined the different nationalities on so-
called neutral ground’.86 Julius Alexander Schindler, a respected writer and Alma Mahler’s 
favourite uncle, echoed these sentiments: ‘Austria is a cosmopolitan work of German power 
and culture; the German was and is the most loyal Austrian, he does not recognise any 
separatism’.87 Pratobevera gave the final speech. He appealed to common liberal wishes, 
‘[w]e want a constitutional, a truly constitutional unified Austria (Bravo!). We want the 
revitalization of the Empire ...’88 The NFP hailed the Lower Austrian address debates as an 
exemplary parliamentary discussion carried out at a high level, comparable to what one may 
hear in London or Paris.89 One week later the liberal majority in the Upper Austrian Diet 
presented an address which similarly called for the reinstatement of the constitution.90 On 
the same day the Salzburg Diet presented its address. There was no debate and it was 
unanimously supported. The address repeated the calls for the reinstatement of the 
constitution and the involvement of a representative body in government decision-making.91  
The most contentious address debates took place in the Moravian and Bohemian 
Diets where the German nationalist representatives were in the minority due to the 
composition of the Great Landowners’ curia. The Moravian debate started on 4 December 
1866 and lasted for three days. The majority address supported by the Czech nationalists and 
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conservative nobles referred to the federalist October Diploma as the basis for any future 
organisation of the Monarchy, while the Hungarian dualist proposals were treated with 
caution.92 The minority address was written by Karl Giskra, one of the leading centralist 
liberals in the 1860s, who gave an impassioned speech defending the February Patent as the 
basis of legal representation in Austria. He reiterated that the Imperial Parliament was the 
only correct forum for considering any Compromise with Hungary.93 Despite a centralist 
tendency in Moravian-German liberal ranks, the wording of the minority address was not 
overly centralist, indeed it argued that the respective representative bodies should arrive at a 
speedy agreement over Hungary.94 Centralist sentiments were, however, not far from the 
surface. The arch-centralist Alfred von Skene attacked his Moravian conservative and Czech 
nationalist opponents, describing them as small minded and lacking commitment to the 
Austrian state.95 Skene still dreamed of a centralised state: 
 ... it will be one Austria, with unified interests. And once the unity is there, the rights 
of citizens will come – they will remain in place and, in any case, will bring equality 
– and then absolutism, as it is now, will be buried forever. (Bravo! Left).96 
Skene’s vision left no room for compromise with Hungarian demands; it favoured a strong 
government and a central parliament which, together, could realise the Austrian state idea, 
cultivate a sense of belonging but also allow space for citizens to develop.97 These were the 
ideals of many Austro-German liberals and Skene was very reluctant to compromise them.98  
 Skene’s speech prompted Egbert Belcredi to defend the majority address.99 E. 
Belcredi, who had sat on the address committee, had not wanted a substantive address, 
believing instead that the circumstances demanded a simple expression of loyalty. In his 
speech, E. Belcredi described the February Patent as bringing four wasted years since there 
had never been a real Imperial Parliament due to the various boycotts. On the other hand, he 
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argued, the October Diploma had never been allowed to fully develop; it had protected the 
rights of each crown land and should constitute the basis of any Compromise with 
Hungary.100 Alois Pražák, the long time leader of the Moravian Czech nationalists and later 
Justice Minister in the 1880s, concluded the debate reiterating the majority’s arguments for 
crown land autonomy and support for the October Diploma. He too criticised the February 
Patent’s Imperial Parliament as an ‘impossible experiment’.101 In the end, no draft attained a 
majority and a simple address of loyalty had to be sent.102 The debates in Moravia widened 
the gap between German and Czech nationalists while also highlighting the competing 
conceptions of the Monarchy’s political system. 
 The address debate in Bohemia followed shortly after and was even more heated. 
The majority address drafted by Rieger and Clam-Martinic, was similar to the one in 
Moravia, arguing for autonomous development, more powers to the crown land Diets and 
adherence to the October Diploma.103 Self administration, the federalists argued, would lead 
to renewed political consciousness and state strength. Finally, the draft made a plea for 
equality among the nationalities of the Monarchy. The minority address, drafted by Herbst, 
blamed the Monarchy’s woes on Richard Belcredi’s ministry and its ‘policy of 
suspension’.104 Without oversight and control from the Imperial parliament, the address 
opined, the government had exercised free reign to pursue its policies and instead of reform 
these had produced stasis and financial deterioration. The result was widespread 
‘pessimism’; a word also used in the Lower Austrian and the Moravian minority addresses.  
In conclusion, the minority address made three demands: a responsible government system, 
the restoration of constitutional life and the convening of the February Patent’s Imperial 
parliament as the constitutional representative body of the people. 
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 In the debates, Ignaz von Plener, the Finance Minister in Schmerling’s cabinet, 
presented the centralists’ viewpoint. He stressed the seriousness of the situation, especially 
for foreign relations, and stated that any compromise with Hungary would involve a 
weakening of the Austrian state.105 Ottokar Zeithammer outlined the Czech nationalist view 
in the debates, which was strongly Austro-Slavic; that the Habsburg Monarchy was an 
umbrella state protecting the small peoples caught between Germany and Russia.106 Jindřich 
Jaroslav Clam-Martinic, the long-time leader of the Bohemian conservative nobles, absolved 
the Belcredi government of responsibility for the military defeat and defended its suspension 
of the constitution. Suspension had attempted to solve the failure created by the February 
Patent, he argued, and sought to base the Empire instead on ‘the understanding of people 
under the balancing rule of the Crown’.107 
Herbst rose to the challenge and in a desperate time for the Bohemian-German 
liberals, gave one of his greatest speeches. He began by arguing that in the changed 
conditions the monarchy needed a strong state above all.108 While the Czech nationalists and 
conservatives had argued that the federal principle strengthened the state, Herbst appealed to 
the course of history to show that every federal state had eventually moved towards a unified 
state.109 If an organism is divided into nineteen separate parts then the organism is not 
strengthened, argued Herbst. He next ridiculed the legal arguments of the Bohemian state 
rights proponents; theatrically reading from Ferdinand II’s 1627 Landesordnung that had 
reduced the Bohemian Diet’s privileges. Given the present circumstances, Herbst continued, 
the ministry and the bureaucracy had to be controlled by a central representative body.110 
This had been the problem with the Belcredi ministry, argued Herbst; there had been no 
control or oversight from representatives of public opinion.111 Thus, Herbst concluded, the 
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Imperial Parliament should be called to represent the people in the negotiations with 
Hungary.112  
Clearly Herbst, Giskra and the bulk of the Austro-German liberals were moving 
away from any ideas of strict centralism and towards recognition that a Compromise with 
Hungary was unavoidable. The basis of a united liberal approach was forming out of the 
address debates and the behind-the-scenes manoeuvring. The liberals would accept the 
Compromise with Hungary – as pushed by Kaiserfeld and the Autonomists – but without 
wide-ranging regional autonomy, which could have been the basis for a Czech nationalist-
Autonomist alliance. There would also be a powerful, constitutional Imperial Parliament, so 
important for Herbst, Giskra and their supporters, but it would be limited to Cisleithania, not 
the entire empire. Finally, the liberals asserted a special role for Germans and their language 
within the Habsburg Monarchy. This consensus amongst liberal factions was confirmed in 
the Styrian Diet’s address debates. On 10 December 1866, Kaiserfeld emphasised two 
common points – a return to constitutional government and the continued hegemony of 
Germans in Austrian public life. 
Only a constitutional Austria or nothing more! ... a state which assumes ‘Great 
Power’ status and is also constitutionally governed, can only fulfil those two 
conditions ...  if it has at the very least one nationality taking the undisputed 
leadership in political and diplomatic affairs.113 
 
According to Kaiserfeld, the leading nationalities could only be the Germans in the West and 
the Hungarians in the East. The Imperial Parliament should be called into session, a 
parliamentary government formed and negotiations begun with the Hungarians for a 
constitutional, liberal, dualist monarchy.114 His colleague Karl Rechbauer similarly wanted 
the constitution to secure German existence, culture and education.115 Four days later the 
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Carinthian Diet agreed on a similarly-worded address.116 Crucial support at this time came 
from Hungarian politicians. The circle around Deák and Andrássy had from the start wanted 
the approbation of a Cisleithanian representative body as extra insurance for any negotiated 
Compromise.117  
At the same time the Diets with federalist majorities continued to assert their 
respective stances against the February Patent and the central state. The Istrian Diet, with an 
Italian nationalist majority, debated its address on 4 December 1866 and called for autonomy 
at a local and regional level.118 Similarly when the Galician Diet debated its address on 7 
December 1866, Zygmunt Rodakowski for the Polish nationalist majority argued that 
centralisation was not conducive to freedom and progress and that regional autonomy should 
be pursued.119 Belcredi had installed the Polish leader Agenor Gołuchowski as Governor in 
Galicia on 23 September 1866 and held out the promise of substantial Polish autonomy.120 
The Ruthenians, who submitted a minority address, wanted equality in Galicia and supported 
a return to the February Patent.121  
 Circumstances were, however, turning against the federalists. The Austro-German 
liberals finally showed some unity, their Hungarian liberal counterparts sent encouraging 
signs and Beust believed that dualism was the only viable way forward. The Austro-German 
liberals were still not included in any official Compromise talks, though both Beust and 
Andrássy sounded them out about their demands in the event of a dualist structure.  Francis 
Joseph, too, seemed now to lean towards the Hungarians and the Austro-German liberals.122 
On an earlier visit to Prague, Francis Joseph had met with Rieger and Clam-Martinic, who 
stated their expectation for a Bohemian Compromise similar to any Hungary received.123 
When the Czech nationalist delegation had an audience with the Emperor on 17 December 
1866 to present their majority Diet address he acted in a very cold manner.124 Despite his 
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reservations, the Emperor could ultimately accept dualism since, as Belcredi noted in his 
memoirs:  ‘two independent parliaments are not dangerous at all and even desired by the 
Crown, since what the Emperor cannot obtain from one parliament, can be achieved from 
the other’.125 This juggling between institutions and manipulation of the dualist system 
would be a feature of subsequent decades. 
 The tide was running against the federalists but Belcredi had not yet given up hope. 
After the Diet debates he allegedly stated to a friend that: “Now, you see, I am still alive.”126 
On 23 December 1866 he persuaded the ministerial council, including Beust, to call an 
extraordinary Parliament coupled with new elections for the Diets. This would not be the 
Imperial Parliament under the February Patent but simply an extraordinary meeting of crown 
land representatives to consider the Compromise with Hungary. The terminology implied 
that it would not meet regularly.127 An official patent issued on 2 January 1867 did not 
specify how the Diets would elect deputies to the Parliament (Belcredi allowed each Diet to 
decide either by curia voting or by majority voting). The latter method potentially meant the 
complete exclusion of Austro-German liberal representatives from Bohemia, Moravia, 
Carniola and possibly also in Tyrol as well as the exclusion of their allies, the Ruthenians, 
from the Galician Diet. In all probability, Belcredi’s extraordinary Parliament would have 
produced a strong federalist-Slav-conservative majority.128 Indeed, some calculations 
estimated the federalists as having at least 114 representatives and the German liberals only 
89.129  
Just as the Austro-German liberals were conceding the Compromise with Hungary 
and coming together as a united political force, they now faced the possibility of a federalist-
Slav-conservative parliament negotiating the future of Austria with the Hungarian 
parliament. All German liberal discussions of dualism had rested on the presumption of joint 
 31 
German-Hungarian hegemony and of a regular central parliament for the Cisleithania – 
Belcredi’s extraordinary Parliament was a direct challenge to this thinking. Finally, after 
months of juggling between different alternatives, the Emperor had to make a decision 
between two clear alternatives – Beust’s dualism based on German and Hungarian 
hegemony or Belcredi’s more federalist procedure involving all the regional Diets. The 
terms and conditions of these alternatives had been determined by the manoeuvring, pressure 
and demands of the various political groupings, including the Austro-German liberals who 
had originally appeared in weak position. The endgame to the Compromise would be played 
out between Beust and Belcredi in the presence of the Emperor. 
 
     ***  
 
Belcredi’s January Patent for the extraordinary Parliament sealed the convergence of the 
Austro-German liberals. They were now completely united, fighting for their February 
constitution and their position in the monarchy.130 Rechbauer summed up the mood best 
when he stated that the calling of the extraordinary Parliament had broken the apathy of the 
people.131 On 13 January 1867 the leaders of all the German liberal fractions met at Adolf 
Pratobevera’s residence to discuss their strategy towards Belcredi’s extraordinary 
Parliament. Delegates from all factions attended including Kaiserfeld, Karl Rechbauer, Ignaz 
von Plener, Anton von Auersperg, Ignaz Kuranda, Alfred Skene, Josef Lasser, Karl Wiser 
while Herbst and Giskra sent letters of support. The resolutions from the meeting demanded 
a boycott of the extraordinary Parliament and the calling of the legal Parliament under the 
February Patent.132 In the face of stark realities the liberals concentrated on their essential 
points of agreement. The centralists were prepared to accept dualism and the Autonomists 
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were no longer entertaining federalist ideas. The basis of the Constitutional Party’s next 
decade had been laid. 
Beust and the Hungarian delegates finalised the terms of the Compromise on 8, 9 and 
10 January 1867. After concluding the Compromise with the Crown’s representatives, the 
NFP reported a rumour that the Hungarian delegates had also met the German liberals to 
reach an agreement. 
If our information is correct, once the German Constitutional Party decides to discard 
the points in the February Patent which contradict the Hungarian constitution, then 
the Compromise question can be considered completely settled ... Would the Slavs in 
alliance with the Government be strong enough to resist a German-Hungarian 
alliance?133 
The Hungarian liberals had access to the Austro-German liberal meetings and both sides 
made a conscious effort to understand each other.134 Deák’s party, especially Andrássy, 
opposed any involvement of Cisleithanian representatives in the substantive terms of the 
Compromise but wanted the support of the German liberals for the concluded agreement.135 
With the essential terms of the Compromise finalized the main issue was how to bring it into 
effect. There were three possibilities for the Cisleithanian side: either it could be decreed by 
the Emperor, or it could be debated and ratified by Belcredi’s extraordinary Parliament, or it 
could be confirmed by the February Constitution’s ‘narrow’ parliament. Privately, 
Kaiserfeld told Belcredi that a decree should be used as this would be the quickest 
method.136 Some Austro-German liberals were now prepared to accept the Compromise as a 
fait accompli without any input from Cisleithanian representatives, provided they were given 
their ‘legitimate’ Parliament under the February Patent.137  
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 Ultimately, it was still the Emperor’s decision about how to realise the Compromise. 
Beust was of the opinion that the extraordinary Parliament would never happen since the 
German parties were refusing to co-operate.138 In two lengthy memoranda dated 25 and 26 
January 1867 Beust set out his position to Francis Joseph. Beust argued for the end of 
Belcredi’s suspension policy which had been mercilessly attacked by the independent 
newspapers.139 There should be a return to constitutional life under the February Patent, 
Beust wrote, since any attempts at absolutism would face a barrage of negative public 
opinion. Foreign policy calculations were also of great importance to Beust since a 
constitutional, German-led Austria could combat pan-Slavism and possibly act as an 
attractive, progressive counter-weight to Prussian dominance in Germany. The southern, 
Catholic, German states in particular were wary of Bismarck’s Prussia in the new 
arrangements in Germany and might be attracted to a liberal German-led Austria, he noted.  
 The elections for Diets, which would in turn send delegates to the extraordinary 
Parliament, took place in late January and early February 1867, though all political parties 
were looking to Vienna for some direction. Beust leaked the contents of a meeting with 
Andrássy which questioned the idea of the extraordinary Parliament and implied that the 
elections would not be very meaningful.140 Combative to the end, Belcredi published an 
anonymous pamphlet which pleaded for German involvement in the Diet elections and the 
extraordinary Parliament arguing that they were to facilitate constitutional life.141 He also put 
immense official pressure on bureaucrats to vote in a federalist manner and hoped to 
influence the Great Landowners in Bohemia, Moravia, Galicia and Carniola to vote for the 
government list.142 For the Austro-German liberals the situation had crystallised into a 
simple quid pro quo – acceptance of the government negotiated Compromise in return for 
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constitutional life in Cisleithania based on the February Patent. Giskra’s election speech in 
Brünn/Brno made this clear:  
The Compromise with Hungary is, I assert, absolutely necessary for the power status 
and development of Austria ... [After defending the February Constitution and 
attacking the extraordinary Parliament, Giskra concludes:] A constitutional basis for 
the Emperor and the Empire! (loud and long applause).143 
Moravia was one the strongest centralist-tending regions in the Monarchy and if their leader 
was openly prepared to concede the Compromise then the centralist wing of the liberals 
would no longer openly oppose an agreement with Hungary. 
 At an informal meeting on 27 January 1867 the Emperor informed Belcredi that he 
had decided to follow Beust’s plans; namely, a decreed Compromise and an ‘ordinary’, 
‘narrow’ Parliament based on the February Patent to ratify it (but not to negotiate or 
fundamentally amend the concluded agreement).144 While Belcredi defended his desire for a 
longer process involving consultation with different regional crown lands, the Emperor now 
wanted to push decisions and to stabilize the Monarchy. The Emperor also confirmed that he 
was prepared to be crowned King of Hungary. Despite already making up his mind, Francis 
Joseph scheduled a final discussion of the matter at the ministerial council meeting of 1 
February 1867. Just prior to the meeting, Beust made his viewpoint clear to Belcredi, ‘if I 
have the Germans and Hungarians for me, I don’t have to fear the opposition and enmity of 
the other nationalities!’145 There were echoes of Andrássy’s (and perhaps Kaiserfeld’s) 
influence in this statement. On 1 February 1867 Francis Joseph chaired the meeting that 
debated the options and after due consideration he decided for Beust’s approach.146 Two 
days later Belcredi resigned as a Minister-President and State Minister and Beust added this 
position to his existing post of Foreign Minister. 
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A few outstanding matters needed to be addressed to facilitate the new arrangements. 
The Polish Governor Agenor Gołuchowski was immediately called to Vienna and consulted 
about the possibility of the Poles attending the February Patent parliament and thus 
participating in sanctioning the Compromise agreement. Beust had been speaking with 
conservative Polish nationalist leaders since early January 1867 and could now offer them 
considerable autonomy in Galicia for administration, justice and education. In addition, the 
elections to Diets that would choose deputies to the extraordinary Parliament had to be 
stopped and the ‘ordinary’ Parliament elected in accordance with the February Patent. This 
was done by a patent of 4 February 1867. In the Diets of Bohemia, Moravia and Carniola, 
which had federalist majorities, new elections were called with the expectation of achieving 
a centralist, constitutionalist majority. The Monarch’s direct representatives applied pressure 
through official channels to obtain votes in the Great Landowners curia in favour of the 
Constitutional Party.147 The road to the 1867 constitutional laws, the Burger Ministry and a 
constitutional Cisleithania now lay open.  
 
    *** 
  
There are four points to be made in conclusion: two in relation to the Austro-German 
liberals and two in relation to the wider political situation in the Monarchy. First, for the 
Austro-German liberals the events of 1866 and 1867 meant the gradual convergence of 
different factions around the acceptance of dualism as the default structure of the Monarchy. 
The limits of Austro-German liberal ideological flexibility had gradually become apparent. 
By sacrificing centralism and acquiescing to dualism, the liberals appeared to secure their 
core demands for constitutional government and a hegemonic role for German-speakers in at 
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least the Western half of the Monarchy. Austria’s political exclusion from the new Germany 
and the mooted possibility of a federalist Cisleithania had greatly affected the liberal 
camp.148 In the wake of Königgrätz it was clear from the November-December Diet address 
debates that German national sentiment within the Austro-German liberal camp was slowly 
moving away from a belief in an expansive cultural and political All-German sphere towards 
an increased concern at the position of German-speakers within the Habsburg Monarchy.149 
In general, for the German-speakers in the Habsburg Monarchy there was a turn inwards and 
towards a defence of Austro-German interests which was gradual, differentiated but 
significant. After initial uncertainty, the Constitutional Party had re-founded itself by 
acknowledging the necessity of dualism and by focusing its attentions on achieving its 
constitutional goals and the protection of Austro-German hegemony in Cisleithania.   
Second, through the press, political programmes and representative bodies, the 
Austro-German liberals expressed their views and forced an open, public discussion about 
the future of the Monarchy. By their vigour and seriousness, the liberals slowly built an 
open, liberal society yet, at the same time, also facilitated the articulation of competing 
viewpoints – whether based on nationality or conservatism – and often drew the enmity of 
the Emperor. These developments came to fruition in 1879 when the Emperor turned to the 
conservative and Slav federalist parties to form a constitutional government. The liberal 
articulation of their beliefs had facilitated sweeping achievements in the 1860s and 1870s, 
not only in constitutional government, legal framework and institutional reform but also in 
the basic terms of political discourse and the general acceptance of constitutionalism, civil 
rights, justice, parliament, education, responsible government, progress and legal equality. In 
the formative decades of constitutional and parliamentary life the Austro-German liberals 
pushed and prodded the traditionally conservative Monarchy towards fundamental and long-
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lasting reforms, even if their opponents often benefited from those reforms in the long run.150 
The months after Königgrätz saw a crucial period of redefinition in this ongoing, evolving, 
protean Austro-German liberal project to create a modern Austria.  
Third, the balance between political groupings within the monarchy was clearly a 
delicate one. There were many possible constellations and frequent changes both within and 
between groupings in terms of power and influence. The Austro-German liberals did not 
fully grasp this. Given their traditions of Josephinist state service and belief in German 
culture, they assumed that they were indispensable to the running of the monarchy and that 
they deserved a privileged position. Austro-German liberal hubris cost them dearly in the 
1880s when Eduard Taaffe’s conservative-Slav coalition proved that the Monarchy could be 
constitutionally ‘run without the Germans’.151  Hubris blinded the Austro-German liberals to 
the reality that politics in the Habsburg Monarchy depended on making strategic alliances 
and maintaining the Emperor’s favour. Looking back many years later Skene, who had been 
a principled liberal critic throughout the 1860s, observed to Schmerling that ‘we were then 
really unintelligent and inexperienced men, now we regret it all’.152 Even the Hungarian 
liberals who were the best placed in 1866-67 recognized that they still needed the agreement 
of the Austro-German liberals if their dualist system would be realized. The Czech 
nationalist camp similarly recognized the need for allies, such as the Autonomists and/or 
Poles. When reflecting on events decades later, Rieger blamed his erstwhile allies, the Poles, 
for accepting Beust’s offer of regional autonomy.153  
Finally, Francis Joseph showed again that he would remain sole arbiter of the 
monarchy’s important matters. He was prepared to make individual compromises with 
different groupings but did not want to promote a unified stance among the nationalities, 
particularly not a multi-national liberal alliance. Adolph Fischhof’s dream of a conference of 
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leaders drawing up an agreed liberal constitution was his monarch’s nightmare. Francis 
Joseph never seriously considered a constitutional convention where all parties could 
hammer out an agreement each could live with. Instead, he preferred to retain as much 
power as possible, to let the political situation drift, possibly even to allow the parties to 
harden their positions and then to mediate matters either personally, through trusted 
representatives or through his government. Many possible points of agreement and grounds 
for co-operation among different parties quickly disappeared amidst the frantic manoeuvring 
for favour and second-guessing of the Monarch’s prevailing opinion. Any non-sanctioned 
alliance amongst political groupings could have hamstrung the Monarch and created a 
powerful rival for political authority within the Empire. The old Habsburg tactic of ‘divide 
and rule’ was continued into the dualist era since, as Belcredi had noted, there remained 
considerable flexibility and ambiguity in its institutions and workings.154 Within this 
complex matrix of political groupings and institutions the Austro-German liberals 
constituted an important component. Ultimately in 1866-67 and indeed throughout his reign, 
for Francis Joseph the most important considerations were the Monarchy’s status as a ‘great 
power’ and the well-being of his military.155 In this respect the Compromise of 1867 largely 
achieved these goals.156 In return Francis Joseph was forced to accede to the liberals’ 
principal demands which, then, laid the foundations for a new constitutional state and 
society. 
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